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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MARIE E. PE:TERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

10524

WE8TERN CASUALTY AND
SURE TY COMP ANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEl\IEN'J1 OF THE XA'fFHE OF THE CASJ.<~
Responcl<'nt, plain ti ff :n th<' low<'l' eourt. hrm~g!it ai~
action again~t tlw dPf Pn(lant, np1i<'llant ltt>rPin, a~ tlu·
insnrer of 01w CJrnek Nhim L('i\·, to n•co·;pr th(' hP1wfit~
nf L<'i\·'s antornohilc' irnmrauct' poli('y and han· tlH'
polie_i· Jll'<)('('<'<l:-; 1;aid oYt' · ~o n·~:: mclPili to\':anl..- sati~-

...
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DISPOSIT£0N OF' THE LOWJ~R COURT
Respondent and apptdla11t Paeh fil<>d motions for
summary judgru<>nt, \rhieh motions were heard at thP
pretrial. Ilespondent ,,·as graniP<l a st1111111ary ;judg:nHmt.
against appellant for the sum of $10,000.00 on her first
cause of action, and n•spondl'Ht's Sl'r'.on<l cause of action
was dismissed.
RELIEF SOFGHrP ON APPEAL
Respondent s<~eks to have the court affirm the
judgment of the. pretrial court against appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The instant appeal from the lower court arises out
of a judgment rendered on behalf of respondent against
one Chuck Shim Lew, Civil No. 1±328(), as filed in the
District Court of Salt Lake County (Supplemental
transcript). That case was based upon an au to mo bile
accident occurring while respondent was a guest passenger in a northbound vehicle on Ninth East when her
vehicle collided with the insured's vehicle traveling
west on :27th South in Salt Lake City, Utah in the morning hours of Febrnary 24, 1963. A dispute existed between respondent's driver and Lew as to which vehicle
was favored with the "right of way" because of the
traffic semaphore.
Respondent's host driver, DP1mis l\frl\[illan, submitted to a deposition at th<> request of appellant's
eonnsel on Augnst 9, 19G3, the deposition being re·
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r1•ived in PvidP1we h~- ti1(• lowPr court in this case as

D-11. In tlint deposition, .l\IcMillan testified the
ligl1t was green wltPn the vc•hiele he was driving entered
the intersedion, anJ while in the intersection he ob~ervt~d the green light change to amber from the refl(dion of the light on th!' hood of his vehicle (D-11,
page 16). A contra1·r statement of pmported fact found
at page 3 of appl~llant's brief is not borne out by the
record in this case. H concerns the nature of the prol:e<'dings in which Le\: snv1)0sedly testified he had the
c>;n•(m light and respondent's driver had the red light
at the time of each vehicle entering the intersection,
as on page 22 of Exhibit D-11, the deposition indicates
appellant's insured "in another trial proceeding" testified McMillan \\·ent through a red light without reference to the civil or criminal aspects involved. It is conceded that no other eye witnesses are known except
respondent who also testified in her deposition that the
light was green at the time the vehicle in which she
was a passenger entt>red the intersection (Exhibit D-10,
page 16).
1'~xhibit

A civil action was commanded on May 23, 1963, in
which respondent was the plaintiff and appellant's insured was the defendant. Personal service was had over
Lew on May 24, 1963, and the usual insurance company
answt>r was filed Jun0 11, 1963, together with a notice
of taking of respondent's deposition received as Ecxhi hit D-10, after whith the host driver's deposition was
1aken (Exhibit D-11).
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In the' intc·ri1u ''i';:dlnu(:-; , ,;;:,l'-'Pl '" r:Jt,, it::-; in:-;nn·d
Exhibit _!)_;3) aci':ii :1,'"' ]1 in of' th(·i,· '~l'lh'arnnce into
the case, w~1iclt ldt(•r 11·a:-; 1 ul :J,.LC'd. This l<'ttPr wa~
Wl'ittt:>n to the i11:;u1ul at,,:_:., .]1·ffc-1 '-'1l!l ;.;t1·(·et, Sal'c LaL~
City, ltali, n1:c'. IW~ to th<' <L:.~r '"'" c.J' t;;c· i1LSnn'd 011 the
polic,\· (Exltiliit D-:) -,,lt:cli 1,a:-; 3:21 First Avl'mle, Salt
Lake City, L·tah. ~\1-<·ording tu apv·ib::i:'s 1·ounsPl 1111
n~ceiving back ExJ1ibit D-J, he ~' mght tlw senice of an
independent insurance adjus~er, \1-lto obtained an address uf L(·\\ in California. 011 ~eptember G, 19G3, Exhibit D-J a lettl'l' 1\·n:-: 11 rittc'n, add1·,·c-sL'd to S3J Jefferson
Street, Salt Lakt:> City, l"tah, ·with a carbon copy to 301
Boyle .A.venue, Los Angeles, Californja. 1 his letter wa~
essentially the same as the BxhiLit D-3, 11·ith the cxception of an additional :statemc'nt which reads, "VVe are
sending the original of this letter to 838 .Jefferson Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah, and a raruon copy of the letter
to 301 Boyle Avenue, in Los Angeles, i11 the hope that
either the original or the copy \\·ill reach you." (Emphasis ours)
1

1

1

Apparently m res1ionse to the carbon copy of the
letter, a hand printed reply was received by appellant's
counsel bearing the signature of a Chuck Shim Lew and
advising: appellant's conn:sel of a ne\\- address, to wit,
Chung King Hestaurant, 3317 Market Street, Hivt>rside,
California, and a telephone number of OY-G-7:29:2; which
lettt:>r specifically stated: "l 1Yish to know if I have to
appear in court with ~-nu and tlte (bte to ap1war in
court." In respon:se to thi:-;, appellant',.., eoun:sel wrote
l~xhibit D-G to the 1\lal'kd Sh'c>t<t ndJress merelr rn-
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1nn11i11g Ll'\\. thnt lil' \rnnl<l lw advised when it \Yould
!H' necp;;:,;ary for hirn to appPar in court .
• \ noti('(' of n•adinl·;;:-< fo1·
:..:~,

trial was filed September

I %3.

In mid Oetolwr 1%:), ~lr. Herbert C. Papenfuss,
Lew\; agent at ·w, .,;~Pm, went to California and while
th<'l'l' attempted to c·Pntact Lew, only to find that he had
ll·ft California and hau probably gone to Yancouver.
J\ otwithstanding aehtal knO\dedge to appellant of
Ln,·'s nnlrnown \\·lw1·eabonts, the record is void of any
attPmpt to contact Le\\' or wrify his whereabouts until
after the pretrial which was held February 4, 1964,
11·hich resulted in the writing of Exhibit D-7 directed to
Lew in care of Chung King Restaurant, 3817 Market
Street, Rivenside, California, (which letter was returnL'd), with a carbon copy to Lew, at 838 Jefferson Street,
Salt Lake City, 1-tah, (which letter was not returned.)

Prior to this l\lr. Papenfuss had received a remittance from L<'w giving a return address of a certain
restaurant in BiPnfait, Saskatchewan, Canada, (Exhibit
D-2, page 4).
rl'he reconl next indicates a telephone attempt to
locate Lrw at thP Club 13, in Saskatchewan, and it was
discoven'd that he was no longer there, but was proba1)ly in l\Iiami or in Miami Beach, Florida, (Exhibit D-2,
page 4). Even with this knowledge, Exhibit D-8, on March
(i, HHi-1-, wa;; \nitfrn to Lew at the •Chung King Restaurant adrlress in California; a carbon copy to Lew at the
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Club 13, addn:'~S in Sa:-;1:atclu•\\ an, Canada, aml a carbon copy to LP\\- at tl;j'.) .Jf'i'ferson Stn·d, Salt Lake City,
l~tah, advising LP\\- of tlw ,\larcl1 1:.!th trial date, all of
which \Yen• returned ....;ubseql«·ntl;.- on ~I arch 10, E)G-±,
a formal notlcL' 0f \\. i tlu lnl\rn l o [' c:uunsel and notice to
appoint counsd was i:rnlll'cl to Lt•\1· at the same addresses,
but once agai11 tliv Salt Lake letter was not returned.
(T-44)
The rnattl"'l" eame 011 for cld'ault trial on Mareh 1:.!.
and the trial was continued to l\Jarch 25, 1964, out of
which a judgment was re11de1·ed on belrnlf of respondent
against Lew for the sum of $12,500.00, from which judgment the action against appellant aris~·s.
At the time of pretrial in the instant appeal, judgment was rendered on behalf of respondent on her first
cause of action for the sum o.f $10,000.00, being the policy
limits. Judgment was rendered for appdlant on the seeond cause of action being a claim against vV es tern Casualty and Surety Company for bargaining in bad faith,
which daim was for the sum of $2500.00, the excess
amount of the judgment. This portion of Judge Hanson's
ruling is not on appeal. A judgment for interest on the
entire $12,500.00 ·was also granted to 1·espondent.
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
THE

SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO RESPONDENT

AFTER VIEWING THE FACTS i\IOST FAVORABLE
TO APPELLANT.

1

p 1·inC'ipal <;ll<·stion Ill this appeal is very closely
i (·latecl to a q\H•stion \\ lii<'lt has <·ouie bdore this court
The·

h\·icP

pr<·Yiousl~-:

0/Jerluuislcy l'. Trurclns f11;mnutce Co., 5 Ftah 2d
l \ :29.) J>:!d 10!>::3, and Jlo 11 t !JU me ry 1·. Pre I erred Risk 1vlut,,1il f ;1s1mwcc ( 'o., ______ l~tah :2J .. ____ , -±11 P:2d -1:88. In the
!attn l'HSP, this ('Olld :-:d forth the following test, when
it stated:
.. Jn ordt-r foe· an insurance company to invoke
11011-cooveration dause in its contract and avoid

' it must
itteeting its obligation on that ground,
show that it nsed reasonable diligence in obtaining thP cooperation, that the insured failed, and
that put it (the company) to some disadvantage."
Therefore. thi· main issue in this brief is Judge Hanson's
<'ondusion covering the lack of \Vestern'13 reasonable diliw·uce in se!-'king the cooperation of its insured, Chuck
~him Lew, sinn· al'cording to the l\fontgomery case, the
otl1L'l' two as1wds of the test do not even come into play
until tlw cornpan~- has used reasonable diligence.
It is interesting to note that each of the two foregoing Ptah decisions have relied upon the California
C'.Use of Je11s"il 1·. Eureka Casualty Company, et al., 1935,
j:2 P 2d 5-U, thl• facts of whid1 involved an insured who
1rns a traveling salPsman. Process had been served upon
him, which he Jeliwrecl to the insurance adjuster, and
notified tlw adjuster where he eould be reached in the
('\(•nt ol' trial. ThP irnrnrauce rPpresentative attempted
lo lo(·ate its insured at trial time and was unable to do so.
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On ap]Jt'al in tlH• di red nd ion agni11~t thv c·ornpany,
the California eourt eonelu\h'd that ~lw in::;nred had not
sufficiently be<'l1 ad\'ised as to his obligation and the
need for further C'.oc,1w:c·ation at a foil<' when he could
have been more m·ailalJle for nn:, n•quested assistance.
Analogous and in aceor<lane(' with re::;pomknt':s position
is State Fann illutuul IJ1surnnce Compwiy v. Furmers
1 nsurance Exclrnill!Jl', On·gon J %::l, i38/ P2d 825. Upon
being ~med, the in:snred was ~;lm\' in tnrning over suit
papers to his company. Ldtc:i·s were mailed frolll the
company to the insnrecl reqne:sting coo1wration and also
acknmvledgments of the letters. No aeknowledgments
were ever for.varded. The insured ·was requested to attend trial and an off er to pay expenses was of record
but no acknowledgement ever came from the insured.
The Oregon court in concluding that due diligence had
not been exercised stated on page S30:

"It (the company) should not have been surprised

when he did not UlJlH:ar at the trial in response to
the January letter requesting him to appear."

Further on page 830, the court observed the i>ersonal
advantage that an insurance company could obtain for
itself if permitted to exercise less than reasonable diligenece m obtaining the assistance of its insured and
stated:
"When the insnred's eoo1wration was not to th<•
jnsurer's benefit, it n•lie<l upon lt>ttt>rsj not to
personal contact. It should not .be as~rn1.ned that
in every case, personal contact 1s <~ssential to an
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l'Xerci::;e of clue diligvn<'e. However, in this case,
under all t:iL·eum::;t<J1i;;e::; the absence of an attempt
to have a repn·::;entativ<~ of the insurer personally
attempt ~o ::se<.:m\• the i11::sured's presence at trial,
L::; cla1uagmg tll the defendant's defense."
On a rehearing of the aLove ca::;e, the Oregon court
ia 393 P2d 708, 190-l:, at page 709, stated in discussing its
previous holding:
"vVe held foat the insurer does not prove the exe1·ci::;e of due uili gence simply by showing that one
or more lettei-s were directed to the insured requesting his attenclanre at trial. We believe that
the insured received the written request (as we
must in this case because of the presumption
created by OR~ 41.360 ( 24). His failure to appear
may still not constitute a breach of the cooperation clause of the policy under some circumstances. Thus it may be that after the insured
received the request, he died or was incapacitated
or could not attend without undue hardship. The
cases generally support the view that the cooperation clam;t> is not breached if the insured's failure
to attend is not willful. In some cases, perhaps the
majority, require the insurer to show prejudice to
its position. We do not decide whether these latter
cases are ::;ound. In the present case, there is no
evidence explaining why the insured did not appear. For the rea::;ons expressed in our original
opinion, ,,.e believe that the insurer should have
the burden of showing the insured's failure to
appear was in fact due to his noncooperation."
(The Oregon statute cited is merely a codification
of tlw Connol' Law rule presuming mailed and unreturned letters are received).
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Another analogous case' to the instant a1ipeal is
Penha.ms v. Associated hirle11rnity Corporation (Cal.
1935) 47 P2d 791, wherein tlw insured moved to Los
Angeh~s from San Franci:,,;co. Several letters were rnail(->d
to him with no aeknmdedgHwnt, except in mw instance,
where the insured wrote haek, ''Please advise as to the
outcome of the trial r'. 'l'hen it appeared as if the insured had vanished. About three months before trial, the
company hired private investigators to attempt to locate
him, which efforts \Vere to no avail.
The court in sustaining the judgment against insurance company noted that the company previously to
its being unable to locate their insured had, or should
have had, adequate time to gain his cooperation in preparing their defense if they had so desired.
On page 79±, the California court ;.;tated:

"It made no request whatever upon him during
that time except to keep it informed of his whereabouts.
"It is clear therefore that King (the insured) committed no breach of the policy up to December
12, 1930, the time he left Los Angeles without
notifying appellant as to his future whereabouts,
and the issue narrows dovvn to the single question
of whether under the circumstances above stated
his failure to attend the trial constituted a breach
of a material provision of the policy, the effect
of which was prejudicial to appellant."
In the instant appeal, ]£xhihit D-5 i:,,; the appellant's
hand printed letter from Lew inquiring of appellant's
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<·ounsi>l if it 'votdd lw nPe<•s:-;ary for him to appear at
trial, to whid1 inquir>· ll1e n·ply letter (Exhibit D-6)
merdy states:
''\\'e will adYi:sc· you'' ht>11 it is nccps:mry for vou
to appear in court or of any other action which )·on
might he required to take in connection with this
case.
\\·ith no s1wcifil'. rc•pl~· to Le\\·'s n•qtwst until "B-.ebruary,
1%-!, (Exhibit D-7).
Other cases diseussing the question 0f reasonableness
of efforts to obtain the assistance of their insured are
Johnson v. Doughty (Oregon 1963) 385 P2d 760, in which
the court states at pages 70:2 and 763:
''The t-vidence proved that the insurer did not
mah· a rcasona ble effort to locate Doughty. The
only lettt•r sent to Doughty was directed to an
address known to be incorrect at a time when the
insurer had reason to know of a better address.
The evicknee creates a strong inference that the
insurer did not want to locate Doughty under the
circumstances of the case. Under such circumstances the mere fact that Doughty disappeared
is insuffieient to show lack of cooperation." (Relying 011 P<'11nsyli;anici Thresherman and Farmers
Mitfiwl Ccisualty I 11.surance Company v. Owens,
238 Fed. :2d 5-1:9 Fourth Circuit 1956) (Emphasis
ours).
Another is Pennsylvania Thresherman and Farmer's Mutual Cas1talty Compwny v. Owens (Fourth Circuit) (South Carolina193G), :238 Fed 2d 549, where the
Federal court at page 550 stated:

12
"'l'he vrohlem of noncooperation has a dual
aspect:
Not only what tlw ass med failed to do but what
its vart did to secure the cooperaapathetic inattentive or vanishing
policy holder must he considered. Liability insurance is intended not only to indemnify the ·as~mred
but also to vrotect the members of the public who
may be injured through negligence. Indeed such
insurance is made mandatory in many states. lt
would greatly weaken the practical usefulnPss of
policies designed to afford pub lie protection, if
it \Yere enough to show mere disappearance of
the assured without full proof of proper efforts
by the insurer to locate him." (Citing Tudor v
Commonwealth Casualty Company 163 At. 27, 10
NJ Misc. 1206)
t~e insurer on
tio~ from an

Further on page 551, the court stated:

"vVe

might add that the circumstances afford no
hint to explain vV ood's disappearance. There is no
suggestion of domestic discord; any effort to
escape criminal prosecution or other reason to
abscond. From all that the record shows, he may
have been the victim of foul play or disability
operate was willful. There was no evidence of any
inquiries other than from the wife and the pastor.
No inquiries were made from the police or Wood's
place_of employment, where his employer or fellow
workers might possibly have given a clue to his
whereabouts or at the post office to learn if he had
left a forwarding address. Requiring such additional efforts would not seem to impose an unin which it could not be said that failure to coreasonable burden."
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discussed at length in alJpellant's
IJl'iPr· ean bl' J.iiferentiateu 1rom the fact situation on
nppeal arnl from the ca..,eE; hereinbefore cited in this
hrief:
~ix qf thl' t•igltt

C<lli('S

A. Pu1clik v. StatP Funn ill'llhllll Automobile Insur-

Co., :3()2 F'L·d. :2d :255 (CA 7th 19G:2) was concerned
1rith cliseussion of a fact situation where the insured
wi/lj'11lly failed to ap1war after receiving nctual notice
uf trial date;
1111ce

B. Rohlf

Hil

1:.

Great American Mutual Indemnity,

232, 27 Ohio A pp. 208 ( 1927) involved collusion
IJ:,· the insured and the injured;
NI~

C. Cooper

i;.

Employer's MittualLiability Insurmice

Company of Wisconsi-11, 103 SE :2d 210, 199 Va 908 (1958)
and Grady v. State Farm Midiial Auto Insurance Comprmy, :2().-t Fed :2d 519 (GA 4th 1959) are decided under
a unir1ue Virginia rule of law where failure to attend the
trial in and of itself is lack of cooperation sufficient to
absolve a company from liability.

D. Potomac Insurance Company v. Stanley, 281 Fed
2d 775 (CA 7th 19GO) and Indemnity Insurance Company
of North Am,c'1·iui v. Sniith, 78 A. 2d 461, Md (1951) are

deeided under a different rule of law than is in force in
Lltah, to wit, complete cooperation of the insured is a

conditio11 precedPut to an insured's being entitled to the
l1en(•fit:-; or an insurance policy.
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In comparing th<> foregoing east's "·ith the instant
appeal, it wonld ap1war to th<> writer that appellant
should have been placed on notice of the itint>rant character of its insmPJ a:-; \\ lil'n the sul1ject 1iiatter insurance
policy ~was writte"'.1 on .Jamm1 ~· :2-t, 19G3, Le\Y's address
was 321 First A n'nuc•, ~alt Lak(~ City, Utah (Bxhibit
D-1). The first correspcndence after the accident involving appellant (dakd .July :25, 1963) was directed to 828
Jefferson Street, Salt Lake City, Utah (Exhibit D-3)
which letter was retumed. 'rhen after being located by
an independent insurance adjuster from a re(1nest by
appellant's counsel, original correspondence was directed
to Lew at 838 Jefferson, Salt Lake City, Utah, with carbon copy of the same to 301 Boyle Street, Los Angeles,
Califomia (Exhibit D-4). A hand-printed reply apparently from Lew under date of September 19, 1963, was
directed to appellant's counsel giving an address of the
Chung King Restaurant, 3817 Market Street, Riverside,
California, together with a phone number of "OV6-2792",
(Exhibit D-5), which merely resulted in a short letter
from counsel to Lew, dated September 23, 1963, (Exhibit
D-6).
In mid-October, 1964, actual notice of Lew's having left
the Market Street address and probably California was
given l\Ir. Herbert C. Papenfuss, one of appellant's
agents, when l\fr. Papenfuss went to California and while
there attempted to locate Lew, only to find that he had
gone to Canada, iirohahly to Yancouw~·. The record is
completely void of any attempts to locate him in Canada
at that time.

:
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l 11 th(' first part of .Jnnnar)', 19G-±, a n·mittance was
b)· l'apP111\1st; from Lew giving a return address
u[ "Club 1:3, Bi<'Hfait, >:-la~;lrnteh<''-'·an, Canada", (D-2, page
+, 11 -+5). 'L'ltP n~eonl is fol'ther void of any attempt to
\(•rif~- this or to make contad with Lew at that address
nntil afh·r thl' im'trial lwlu Febrnary -±, 1964.
t'c>tt'i Vl'd

LettPr:s date('. l1'ebrnarv
7' 19GJ' notifvin()"
Lew of the
.I
.r b
trial date vvere obviously useless as they were sent to
Riverside, California, and 838 .Jefferson, Salt Lake City,
l' tali, ( D-7). \Vhen thP l)~lifornia letter was returned,
thn.'atPning lettf'rs elated March 6, 1964 were mailed to
Ll'\\' once again at 8:38 Jeff el'Son, Salt Lake City, Utah;
c,~ Chung King Hestaurant; Riverside, California; and
finally to the Club 13, Hienfait, Saskatchewan, Canada
(D-8) all of which were returned.
It would sPelll only reasonable from the use of three
Salt Lake address0s, two 'California addresses and possibly two Canadian addresses within a twelve month period that Wes tern Casualty should have been on notice
of the tram;ient character of its insured. It s failure to
obtain the insmed's de1>osition under these circumstances; and, its failure in keeping the insured advised
of the expected time lapse before pretrial and the expected time laps<~ from pretrial until the trial, hardly
seems to bL' exercising reasonable diligence in maintaining contact with a nomadic Chinese restaurant worker.
These facts indicate a :similar ;,;ituation to Jensen v.

F,'1trcka, supra.
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In addition to all of these facts tlh' n~cord is absolntely void of any attempted eontac:t with L<~w hy any
private investigator, by any insurance adjuster, by any
credit company, or thrnugh Gt•neral l\Jotors Acceptance
Corporation, the lm;s vay<~e on L(~w\; in:mrance policy.
Therefore, under the rules of Oberhanslcy v. Travelers supra, and M untgomery 'L'. Pref erred Risk Insurance Compa~iy, supra, and the tests contained in those
cases, the principal question before this court is whether
or not in viewing the facts most favorable to the appellant, did it use reasonable diligence in attempting to
obtain the cooperation of its insured, 'vith full knowledge
of his wandering traits. rrhe burden of obtaining Lew's
assistance was left to appellant's counsel which Judge
Hanson concluded was not a reasonable effort by the
company to obtain cooperation; which conclusion should
be sustained.
POINT II ON APPEAL
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACT
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS "AGENTS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY WHO WERE ABLE
TO AT LEAST DETERMINE THE ADDRESS OF
THE INSURED."

Judge Hanson's memorandum decision made the
statement in the above headnote and this conclusion was
reached by him 1yi tltout any evidPnce lwing adduced in
the proffer of proof proceeding:::;. In 31 CJS, Evidence,
Section 36, is found the following:
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"C'oml:,; may tni;(• jud;cial rngnizance of public
01· official 1u:ut<l.o u~ 2,llleral imblic intere:;t induding 1mbl>· 1·c·c·ords in the 1'\•deral and State

(~\.1•cutivtl c1vpnr'111ents, and including public records in th1: 1\·cLial arnl State AdministrativP
lJOdi<>s, sueh ns the ol'fice of the State Treasurer
01· th<c Secretary of State and r<c•cords of other
public officers, (•0111111itkes and admini:;trative
bodies at 1<·20~ to the extent that such records are
re<1uired by hrn .. ,

Jn llcc!lrtn v. Pri!e, 193 P:2d GG:2., (ldaho 19±8) the
Sn!H'tcLW Court of ldaJ10 :;tated at page 668:

"We take judicial notice of the public and priYate acts of the legislature and the journals of
the legi::-;lative bodies. . "
A case iu point with the instant appeal is that of
Gully v. Lwn/!l'rnwn's Mid11al Casualty Company, (Mis:;is-;ivpi 193()) Ui8 ~o. G09, where in the Supreme Court
of 1\lissi::;si ppi, on page GlO stated in discussing whether a
certain insurance rnmpany was authorized by its charter
to do a certain type of business:
"'l'hose facts are shown hy the records of the
office of the insuranee commissioner. The office
of the imml'ance eommissioner is a coordinate
branch of tlw f-ltate government. The courts will
take judicial noti('e of its records and the contents thereof."
'11 herefore, .T udge Ham,;on could properly take judi<: i al

notice of the reeonls of the F tah Insurance Cormnis-

: .; iom'i'. lt i::.; inte1·esting to notP in its 1965 annual report,
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appellant :-tatPd it \\-a" doing h11.'-i111"'"'" in tliirt:- "ewn
:- tates and the District nf (' ::1 um hi a and the 196-± annual
report shm,-s thirty :'ix stat1·,; and the· Di,-trict nf l'olmnbia. Both annual l 1,porb ;-;]ir,,,_- \\" e:-:tnn wa" doing hu::;iness in California nn(l Flrlri·lr,, aJHl tlwrpfore, taking
judicial notice of th1""1' in.l·liC' ref·orrl:-s i" a rt>asonahle lmsis
for arriving at the (·011du:-"ion of the presence of agents
in various parts of the eountry.
POINT III
THE COURT DID :'\OT ERR I.'.\" ITS ASSESS~IE!\T
OF INTEREST AGAIXST THE DEFEi\DAXT AND
APPELLAINT.

Plaintiff in the lower court prayed for judgment on
each cause of action togetlwr with interest on each cause
of action. At the pretrial proeeedings a specific motion
for interest on the entire amount of the judgment was
made (T-4:8).
\Vithout professing to he an expert mathematician,
the proper amount of interest on $12,500.00 at eight percent per annum can be calculated, which sum seems to
be $1771.00.
The priJ?.cipal question for this court to decide is
whether or not an insurance company is liable for interest at the judgment rate on the entire amount of a
judgment until it pays the policy limits towards satisfying the judgment. In this appeal. .Ju<lg1· Hanson oln-iously
intended to grant an award of interest at the rate of
eight percent per annum on $12.500.0ll, 1Yhich respondent
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r·cmkn<l:- i:- the i1rnpc·1· ml<· of law for this court to sustain.

Tn the Ca8!'

or

Ri1:en:ulley Cartage Company 1'.
!fr11rkc.11c-,)'1·c11rity Jn;-;11uu1ce Co11tpany, 1959, 17 Ill 2d
~-t~, 1()1 N"E :2d lGl, 7G ALR :2d 978, judgment was renckred again::;t the insmed for the smn of $175,000.00.
The lllinois court in this case overruled its previous
decision of H1 afsPku i·. Bituminous Ca0uulty Corporation,
1952, 3-1:7 Ill Avp l.+9, 106 NE 2d 204, in construing what
apJH~llant has conceded to be the "standard interest
(·lamw·· liy noting at 11ag·p 990 of the annotation, and the
writer noted:

""rhe court noted to what it called the 'realities
of the relationship between the insurer and the
insured' namely, that under the terms of the policy, the insurer has complete control of any litigation from which it might incur liability; that
the insured cannot settle with the injured person without relieving the insurer from its obligation; that any delay which may cause the accumulation of interest is therefore the responsibility of
th(~ insmer and that for this reason until the insurer has discharged its obligations under the
policy, it should bPar the entire expense of such
delay. As a recognition by the insurers themselves
of the Yalidity of the last argument, the court
referred to a recent change in the standard interest clause approved by the National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters, which made absolutely
clear the liability of the insurer for interest on
the entire judgment.
ThP principal that interest is recoverable on
the full amount of the judgment is also supported
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by some text ·writers. (See, i.e., Risjord Underwriting Intent, 7 Fe.dPratiun of Insurance Counsel
Quarterly 41, as quoted in United Service Automobile Association v. R11sson 1957, Court of Appeals Fifth, Texas) 2-1:1 Fed 2d 296: 'When the
policy ref erred to all interest, the underwriters
meant all interest on the judgment ·whatever its
size in relation to the policy limits .... The September 1, 1956, Standard Family Automobile Pol- i
icy makes this point clear by stating the company
is liable for all interest on the entire amount of
any judgment."
Also, in support of respondent's position are the numerous other cases found in 76 ALR 2d 987.
Appellant in its brief on page 34 cites to this court
the Ohio case of Carlile v. Vari, 113 Ohio 233, 177 NE 2d
()94 (1961), as stating the Ohio rule; however, this overlooks the case of Coventry v. Steve Koren, Inc., 1 Ohio
App 2d 385, 205 NE 2d 18, which appf'ars to this writer
to overrule the earlier Carlile case.
The court's attention is directed to the provisions
of Wes tern's policy which states :
" ... costs taxed against the insnred in any such
suit and all interest on the entire amount of any
jndginent therein which accrues after entry of the
judgment and before \Ve stern has paid or. tendered or deposited in court that p&rt of the JUdgi 1wn1 whif'h does not E'XCf'ed tJw limit of w·estern's
liability thereon."
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gnag<' of the above <.:lan:-;e in any other manner than to

eonclude that \\' e:-;tem is obligated for interest on the
P11tire amou11t of any judgment until it pays, tenders, or
cleposii.:,; the funds in the manner prescribed.
'l'here are numerous decisions that vary from the
rule which resvondent seeks this court to uphold; how-

l'Ver, generally tlwse involved cases where the courts
have been called upon lo interpret other policy provisions
other than what we now eall the "standard interest
dause."
A review of the cases in the Annotated Case Service of ALR indieates that a majority ·)f the courts before whom this specific question has come, are now
abiding by the rule stated above in Rivervalley Cartage

Company v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company,
supra.
CONCLUSION
Respondent requests this court to sustain the judgment of the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson in concluding
that as a matter of law in viewing the facts most favorable to Western Casualty and Surety Company, as the
insurer of Chuck Shim Lew, \Vestern did not exercise
reasonable diligence in obtaining the cooperation of its
insured; thereafter, directing its attorneys to withdraw
n.s his counsel when he could not be located two days
'
before trial.
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In addition respondent requests this court to sustain
the judgment awarding interest at the rate of eight percent per annum on the entire amount of the judgment
until Western complies with the provisions of the "standard interest clause" of it .; policy. Respondent further
requests this court to award her costs of this proceeding.
Respectfully submitted,
HATCH & McRAE
516 Boston Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for respondent

